

Negation and exhaustification

A brief overview of the exhaustification account of SI

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1. Introduction

- In preparation for Benjamin Spector's talk on **metalinguistic negation**, we'll go over the perspective adopted by Spector and colleagues on the derivation of scalar implicatures
- Chierchia, G., Fox, D. and B. Spector (2012). Scalar implicature as a grammatical phenomenon. In Maienborn, von Stechow and Portner (eds.), *Semantics*, de Gruyter, 2297–2331

2. Negation

- Descriptive negation: truth-conditional
 - “It was not hot on Sunday. It was warm.”
 - “Mary does not have four cats. She has one.”
- Metalinguistic negation: non-truth-conditional (Horn 1985, 1989; Moeschler 2010):
 - “It was not hot on Sunday. It was blazing hot.”
 - “Mary does not have four cats. She has ten.”

2. Negation

- Descriptive negation:
 - “It was not hot on Sunday. It was warm.”
= “It was less than hot”
 - “Mary does not have four cats. She has one.”
= “Mary has less than four cats”
- Metalinguistic negation:
 - “It was not hot on Sunday. It was blazing hot.”
= “It is not enough to say it was hot: it was more than hot”
 - “Mary does not have four cats. She has ten.”
= “It is not enough to say Mary has four cats: she has ten”

3. Scalar implicature

- Traditional view: Gricean reasoning based mainly on the first submaxim of quantity (Grice 1975, Horn 1972, inter alia)
 - “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)”
 - If a speaker utters ϕ , but could equally well have uttered ψ , where ψ is more informative than ϕ , the hearer can infer that there was a reason for the speaker not to utter ψ
 - It’s not the case that the speaker thinks that ψ
 - If the speaker can be assumed to have an opinion, that is, to think that ψ or to think that not- ψ , then the speaker can be inferred to think that not- ψ

3. Scalar implicature

- Example:
 - ϕ = Mary ate **some** apples
 - How do we understand *some*?
 - At least some: encoded meaning
 - Some but not all: strengthened meaning

3. Scalar implicature

- Example:
 - ϕ = Mary ate **some** apples
 - ψ = Mary ate **all** apples
- ψ is more informative than ϕ : anytime ψ is true, ϕ will necessarily be true as well, but the opposite does not hold
- We say ψ entails ϕ

3. Scalar implicature

- Example:
 - ϕ = Mary ate **some** apples
 - ψ = Mary ate **all** apples
- SI:
 - The speaker uttered ϕ
 - The speaker could have uttered the more informative ψ instead but did not
 - Probably the speaker does not believe ψ to be true
 - The strengthened meaning is the conjunction of ϕ with the negation of the more informative **alternative** ψ :
 - $\phi \wedge \neg\psi$ = Mary ate some apples but not all of them
 - “Mary ate some apples and in fact she ate all of them”
 - Cancellability is a hallmark of implicatures

3. Scalar implicature

- Example:
 - ϕ = Mary ate **some** apples
 - ψ = Mary ate **all** apples
- But:
 - ψ' = Mary ate **some but not all** of the apples
 - ψ' entails ϕ too
- Negating both alternatives would lead to a contradiction
 - Mary ate some of the apples but not all of them but also not some but not all of them
- This is called the symmetry problem (Kroch 1972, von Stechow and Heim 1997)
- The SI reasoning requires that the set of alternatives is restricted
 - Horn (1972): lexical scales
 - Criteria: monotonicity, complexity...
 - Katzir (2007): structural alternatives

3. Scalar implicature

- In sum: traditionally, scalar implicatures have been treated as conversational implicatures that
 - arise through reasoning about the speaker's intentions based on a full utterance
 - require two additional assumptions in order not to undergenerate or overgenerate:
 - The opinionatedness assumption
 - Restriction on the set of alternatives

4. A grammatical account of SI

- Chierchia (2004) argues against a globalist view of SI and for a grammatical approach, where SIs are derived compositionally through **silent exhaustification**
 - The strengthened meaning of $\phi = \mathbf{O}(\phi)$, where \mathbf{O} is like silent *only*
 - Exhaustification via \mathbf{O} takes the set of alternatives of ϕ and negates all alternatives that are not entailed by ϕ
 - With amendments to avoid the symmetry problem
 - Exhaustification does not apply vacuously (if it does not lead to a logically stronger, more informative result)
 - $\phi = \text{I } \mathbf{doubt} \text{ that Mary } \mathbf{or} \text{ John will come}$
 - $\pi = \text{I } \mathbf{doubt} \text{ that Mary } \mathbf{and} \text{ John will come}$
 - ϕ entails π
 - Therefore, $\mathbf{O}(\phi)$ wrt. π is vacuous; $\mathbf{O}(\pi)$ wrt. ϕ is not, however!
 - In general, \mathbf{O} is vacuous in when applied to the stronger alternative
 - The monotonicity properties of the alternative determine which alternative entails which

4. A grammatical account of SI

- **Downward entailing (DE)** or monotone decreasing contexts have the property of licensing subset inferences \approx reversing the direction of entailment wrt. **upward entailing contexts (UE)**
 1. “I ate **spaghetti**” entails “I ate **pasta**”
 2. “I ate **pasta**” does not entail “I ate **spaghetti**”
 3. “I did **not** eat **pasta**” entails “I did **not** eat **spaghetti**”
 4. “I did **not** eat **spaghetti**” does not entail “I did **not** eat **pasta**”
- **Negative** declaratives are DE, so the pattern of SIs is reversed wrt. the scalar expression:
 - Mary **or** John will come \leadsto **not**(Mary **and** John will come)
 - It is **not** the case that Mary **and** John will come \leadsto **not**(It is not the case that Mary **or** John will come = Neither Mary nor John will come)

4. A grammatical account of SI

- Chierchia's argument is empirical
 - SIs can be embedded: they sometimes need to be derived not based on a full utterance, but a subpart of it
 - The silent exhaustification operator O needs to be inserted locally, so that it applies before another operator

4. A grammatical account of SI

- Hurford's constraint (HC, Hurford 1974):
 - “A sentence that contains a disjunctive phrase of the form *S or S'* is infelicitous if *S* entails *S'* or *S'* entails *S*”
 - # “Mary ate an apple or a fruit”
- Scalar expressions violate HC
 - “Mary ate **some** or **all** of the apples”
 - “... all ...” entails “... some ...”
- Local exhaustification solves the problem
 - “... all ...” does not entail “... *only* some ...”
 - Does not help in cases where no relevant alternatives are available

5. Negation and SI

- Negation is DE: no SI arises when there are no stronger alternatives to negate
- However, there are cases where negation in a stronger alternative gives rise to an interpretation that is not compatible with the logical meaning
 - These examples can also be dealt with by positing that the silent exhaustification operator can be inserted in embedded positions
 - “Mary did **not** eat an apple **or** a pear; she ate **both**”
= **not** (*only* (... **or** ...)) = not O_{alt} (Mary ate an apple or a pear)
- Other examples:
 - “I don’t think **some** people will come; I think everyone will”
= **not** (*only* (... **some** ...)) = not O_{alt} (I think some people will come)
 - “It was **not hot**; it was blazing hot”
= **not** (*only* (... **hot** ...)) = not O_{alt} (It was hot)
- **These are also used as examples of metalinguistic negation** (Horn 1985, 1989), where negation is used by a speaker who wishes to object to the way an utterance was put
 - “You cannot say that it was hot because it was more than that”

6. Conclusion

- The grammatical approach to SI might explain some cases of metalinguistic negation simply by positing a difference in scope
 - metalinguistic negation = negation that scopes over the exhaustification operator?
- For other cases, an exhaustification-based explanation seems unsuitable
 - /tə'meɪtoʊ/, /tə'mɑːtəʊ/
 - “That is not my wife... because I have no wife”